(Reprinted from: Asian Migrant Yearbook 1998)
"If there had been no IMF, probably the situation [in Asia] would be better than it is today. It seems to me a lot of it may have been induced by the IMF."
(Former US Secretary of State George Shultz)[1]
The unprecedented financial and economic crisis that swept Asia beginning in the second half of 1997 was not totally unexpected. The July 2 devaluation of the Thai baht was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The contagion continues to haunt Asia and the world.
The conditions that spawned the Asian crisis are rooted in years of neoliberal policies (massive privatization, liberalization, integration in the global free market economy) recklessly pursued by these countries. In Asia, the 1990s was a period of cutthroat competition as countries jostled to become the "next tiger" or "the regional center" early in the new millennium; neoliberal policies were pursued like there was no tomorrow. Thus, the NICs like South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore positioned themselves to become the Asian hub by, among others, reforming laws to reduce workers' rights and benefits "in order to improve global competitiveness." Developing countries meanwhile adopted programs like "Philippines 2000," "Malaysia 2010," etc.; even India declared in March 1997 that it aims to be "an economic tiger in four years."[2] In both migrant sending and receiving countries, trade barriers were torn down, labor (especially women) made dirt-cheap, millions of migrants exported and exploited, economies thrown wide open, and all kinds of incentives offered to attract foreign, and largely speculative, capital.
The artificial miracle began to unravel in 1997. Sensing the weakness of the Thai currency and economy since 1996, speculators attacked the baht in the middle of May 1997. On July 2, the government announced that it will float the baht. The attacks widened, leading to a round of effective devaluations across the region, sparking the regional crisis. By October 7, the baht has plunged 44% against the US dollar, the Indonesian rupiah 38%, Malaysian ringgit 21.5%, and the Singapore dollar 7.2%. By the end of 1997, the "Asian contagion" has devastated the economies of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia; even Singapore and Hong Kong were not spared. South Korea, the world's 11th largest economy, was at the brink of collapse. The crisis was made worse by the long-drawn stagnation of the Japanese economy.
The 1997 crisis was unprecedented in its scale and depth. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir lamented that six months of the crisis wiped out more than 10 years of hard-earned economic gains. The worst effects of the crisis are expected to bite in 1998 and 1999; Asian countries will spend the next five years rebuilding and rehabilitating their economies - as well as their "miracle 2000" dreams.
An important footnote to this episode is that the architects of structural adjustment programs, free market globalization and neoliberalism - the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, APEC - failed to foresee such a huge crisis. Ironically, they emerged as "rescuers" after they arranged bailout packages amounting to over US$117 billion.
"If there were no IMF there would be no Asia problem. Maybe there would be individual problems, like Thailand, but it wouldn't be a huge crisis throughout Asia."
(Nobel laureate Milton Friedman) [3]
The turmoil exposed the extreme vulnerability of national economies in the age of globalization. Similar crises have hit individual countries in the past (e.g. Philippines in the mid-1980s, which led to the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship); yet, these did not drag down the whole region. Because of the increased integration of the national economies to the global free market system, the failure of one becomes the disaster of all.
The Asian crisis has striking parallelism to the collapse of the Mexican economy in 1995. After NAFTA (which groups Mexico, the US and Canada under a single free trade area) was implemented, Mexico's economy collapsed. The currency lost 99.9% of its value (from 25 Mexican pesos to 8,500 per US dollar; the government later revalued the Mexican currency). More than one million jobs were lost within one year of the implementation of NAFTA. The crisis threatened to spread in Latin America, even Asia, in what was then called the "Tequila effect." [4]
In Asia, a similar process of free market globalization has been intensifying since the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. In 1994, the APEC "2020 Plan" was adopted, promising to remove trade barriers by the year 2020 in keeping with WTO's free trade agenda. In 1996, the "Manila Action Plan for APEC" translated the members' commitments into actual targets and timetables. Thus, APEC countries (particularly Southeast and East Asia) have been further liberalizing, privatizing, and reforming labor and social policies (i.e. instituting "labor flexibility" schemes and reducing social subsidies). By 1997, these Asian countries collapsed. Like Mexico in 1995, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had to be "bailed out" (for over US$117 billion), but only after they surrendered their economic sovereignty.
But this crisis is not even new. IMF/WB-imposed restructuring programs and loan conditionalities culminated in a debt crisis in the early 1980s which devastated the Third World countries (Asia and Latin America).
Migrants and social groups are actively opposing neoliberal globalization. The poverty, wealth disparities and economic restructuring resulting from this kind of globalization create the primary "push" and "pull" forces behind today's massive export and import of labor.
By their sheer number, the jobs they go into, and the opportunistic policies of governments and labor agencies, migrant workers - especially the women and undocumented - are put in highly vulnerable situations. Therefore, they bear the most direct, immediate and harsh effects of any crisis. The condition of migrant workers is the worst-end indicator of the situation of workers at any given time.
"The main lesson learned from the economic crisis is that foreigners can now manipulate our economy by the simple act of devaluing our currency .... Effectively, they have stolen half of our wealth."
(Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir) [5]
The current Asian crisis has put migrant workers in a "devil and deep blue sea" situation. In the sending countries (e.g. Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh), the "devil" confronted by the workers (and returning migrants) is the worst, and still-deepening, Asian economic crisis - record unemployment, hyperinflation, factory collapses, stagflation. In Indonesia, many have resorted to rioting because of food shortages and economic difficulties; social unrest brought down President Suharto.
By the end of 1998, at least 3.54 million additional workers
are expected to lose their jobs directly as a result of the crisis. As
the situation worsens, the displaced and desperate workers will increasingly
turn to overseas work for survival. Crisis-torn governments will rely on
labor export to provide jobs and generate foreign exchange. [6]
In the receiving countries (South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore),
migrant workers face the deep blue sea - literally. They are rounded-up
and deported by the tens of thousands. In Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand,
the government has resorted to forcible mass eviction of migrants, especially
the undocumented. More than 933,000 migrant workers are expected to be
expelled or laid off by the end of 1998 due to the crisis.
Deported migrants are not welcome in their home countries. For example, the Philippine government has advised overseas Filipino workers hit by the crisis to find work in other countries - instead of going back to the Philippines. For those who ultimately return, it will be like jumping from the pan into the fire - no jobs, no property or land to farm (sold in order to go abroad), huge debts to pay and a family to feed. Those who are allowed to remain in the receiving countries are redeployed in 3D jobs (e.g. Malaysia). Many have been cheated out of their wages and benefits (e.g. South Korea), or can't find work (e.g. Japan, Korea).
The Asian turmoil has therefore created a "double push" which squeezes out workers both from the sending and receiving countries. By the end of 1998, 4.47 million migrant and local workers will have been displaced by the crisis. Where will these millions go?
Migrants, especially the undocumented, grew into millions because receiving countries encouraged or tolerated them during boom years to plug gaps in the labor market (e.g. 3D jobs), and to dampen local workers' wages. They are the most vulnerable segment of the workforce because they are least protected by legal instruments. Migrant workers have no job security and are usually not covered by the host country's social services, health protection or accident insurance. They are usually treated as faceless laborers - economic tools - and not as human beings. Because they are foreigners, they are subjected to dehumanizing conditions and various forms of discrimination. Their human and labor rights are usually not recognized, protected or respected.
Following are some of the immediate effects of the crisis based on reports by migrant monitoring groups as of 31 May 1998. (See Table 1: "Immediate Effects of the Asian Crisis, as of 31 May 1998")
Also see: Hong Kong report (paper); Hong Kong statistics (graphics)
Impact on economy and local workers
* Increased layoffs, especially in construction, restaurant, hotel, financial services industries; over 6,000 have been laid off from June 1997 to May 1998 due to the crisis: e.g. Cathay Pacific (870; might target 800 more), Peregrine (275), British American Tobacco (156), Hutchison Telecommunications (600), Maria's bakery (405); more than 3,300 department store employees have been laid off from November 1997 to April 1998 (including 1,600 from Yao Han and 270 from Wing On); hotel industry unions said more than 400 have been laid off since June 1997; [7]
* At least 10 companies have collapsed from June 1997 to May 1998: e.g. CA Pacific, Peregrine, Yao Han Dept. Store, Maria's bakery, and various securities companies;
* Increase in interest rates; harder life for middle and lower classes, since housing costs and rentals become heavier; government assistance might be necessary;
* Currency remains stable; Hong Kong SAR and Chinese leaders pledged to maintain the Hong Kong dollar peg to the US dollar;
* Rising unemployment; reached 3.9% in May 1998, the worst in 14 years; however, banks claim this is "good for long term competitiveness because it will impair workers' bargaining power, hence cut SAR's labor costs"; [8]
* Government expects economic growth to slow down to 3.5% (from 5.3% in 1997); on May 27, the government reported that first quarter GDP growth will be negative, the first in 13 years [9]; the Chief Secretary commented on June 5 that growth forecast might be lowered; [10]
Impact on migrant workers
* The Indonesian government announced in 1997 that it will increase (threefold) the number of foreign domestic helpers (FDHs) in Hong Kong - i.e. from 22,000 to around 70,000;
* On October 21, 1997, the Democratic Party launched a signature campaign called "I Have to Find a Job" to fight against the importation of foreign labor in the construction sector; [11]
* On December 17, 1997, the government announced the adoption of the Construction Labour Importation Scheme (CLIS) while retaining the controversial Supplementary Labour Importation Scheme; CLIS will take effect on March 1998; both schemes have no quotas; this is a sharp departure from the current quota policy; local unions reacted angrily; [12]
* Minimum wage of foreign domestic helpers were frozen (i.e. no wage increase in 1998); employers are pushing for reduction in minimum wage of domestic helpers;
* On February 17-22, 1998, migrants' advocates held a regional "Lobbying and Documentation Training on Migrants' Human Rights"; the group decided to launch regional campaigns and to jointly monitor migrants' rights violations;
* On February 26, the Provisional Legislative Council repealed the Bill of Rights amendment (made before the 1997 handover) which broadened the scope of the Bill of Rights [13]; progressive pre-handover labor legislations have already been repealed in late 1997;
* On March 19, the Labour Department announced that it is considering legislation on maximum working hours for all sectors, after years of struggle by local unions and migrants' groups; [14]
* No mass deportation of migrants due to the crisis; however, the Immigration Department reported that 27,200 foreign domestic helpers have been terminated from July 1997 to March 1998 due to the crisis; [15]
* On May 23, the government announced a new requirement seeking to develop better relations between FDH and their employers; under the new rule which will take effect on July 6, 1998, the standard employment contract for FDHs will contain a description of their major domestic duties and the accommodations to be provided by the employers; the government hopes this will reduce disputes in the future; [16]
* The government announced that starting May 25, FDHs will be given two-year working visas, instead of having to renew their visas every year; [17]
* In celebration of May Day 1998, migrants' groups went "consulate-hopping" and picketed the Philippine, Sri Lankan, Indian, Indonesian and Thai Consulates; the protestors handed a joint petition letter calling for protection of migrants' rights especially with the ongoing crisis, ratification of the UN migrant workers' rights convention; support services for migrants, including reintegration programs; on May 4, the migrants held a public assembly at Chater Garden;
* On May 24, Indonesian domestic helpers made an exposé on unscrupulous agencies who illegally arranged contracts, underpaid and overcharged Indonesian FDHs; also criticized the consulate for condoning the illegal practice or doing nothing for years; the Immigration Department raided the agencies; more Indonesians have come out to report violations;
* Since December 1997, protests by local trade unions against the CLIS have also intensified; they held various demonstrations, including during May Day; the issue was also highlighted during the May elections;
* On May 24, the Hong Kong SAR held its first legislative council elections; local trade unions and their allied political parties participated; the democrats and independents won 40 of the 60 seats.
Impact on economy and workers
* From January to end-1997, the stock market fell 41%; in January 1998, the rupiah hit bottom at Rp 15,500/US$ (briefly touching 17,000), losing 85% of its value since beginning of 1997; [18]
* On November 5, 1997, the government accepted the US$ 43 billion IMF bailout package with very stiff conditionalities;
* Increase in foreign debt burden due to massive devaluation; foreign debt stood at US$ 133.7 billion in April 1998, which is three times the amount of the IMF bailout;
* In late 1997, the government implemented emergency schemes in response to the crisis: reduced transportation cost by 70% to encourage people to return to the provinces; created a rural credit scheme (as part of IMF program) which extended small loans to 40,000 families; implemented emergency employment scheme e.g. cleaning of streets, canals, etc.;
* In December 1997, analysts predicted that unemployment and economic difficulties will stimulate more militant, independent unionism;
* Food shortages and high prices have erupted into riots;
* Per capita GDP is expected to shrink to US$ 300 in 1998, from US$ 1,200 in 1997; stock market capitalization to drop to US$ 17 billion from US$ 118 billion in 1997; [19]
* In January 1998, the Armed Forces Chief estimated that two million workers have been laid off from June to December 1997 due to the crisis; [20]
* As of January 1998, only 22 of the 286 publicly-listed companies were considered solvent; only four firms have capitalization of US$ 500 million or more (vs. 49 before the crisis); [21]
* By March 1998, social unrest and student demonstrations have spread in various parts of the country, including Jakarta; more than 20,000 troops were deployed in the capital;
* In March, the rubber-stamp parliament elected Suharto to his 7th five-year term as President; he has already ruled for 32 years;
* On April 1, 42 Indonesians forcibly deported from Malaysia reported that they suffered from gunshot wounds; around a hundred others claimed they were beaten and tortured by Malaysian security personnel; [22]
* On May 4, the government raised the prices of gasoline (71%), kerosene (25%), electricity, and transportation as part of the IMF conditionalities; riots broke out in Medan, Jakarta; student protests intensified; military said protests are nearing anarchy and will be dealt with severely: "stop protests, or you will be hurt"; [23]
* On May 21, Suharto resigned as President, handing power to his Vice President and protegé, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie [24]; but the entire government structure remained the same; protests continued over the mere changing of the guards; business analysts said Mr. Habibie is a "mini-Suharto"; [25]
* On May 22, Pres. Habibie announced his new "reform cabinet," but received lukewarm reception; many doubted whether his "uninspiring" new cabinet will survive; [26]
* On May 26, Pres. Habibie freed labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan with fellow political prisoner Sri Bintang Pamungkas; he promised to free 20 more, but human rights advocates say there are 2,000 more political prisoners; on May 27, two more political prisoners were released;
* On May 27, the government also lifted the 32-year ban on trade unions; SBSI, the independent trade union center led by Mr. Pakpahan, was recognized by the government; [27]
* On June 3, the government released its 1998 forecast:
severe economic recession (-10%), hyperinflation (80-85%), highest unemployment
in decades (15%); [28]
3. Japan
* Japan is not directly a victim of the Asian crisis; since the "bubble
economy" burst in 1991, the economy has been performing weakly; in
the past two years, the economy was stagnant and analysts predict a recession;
* The crisis which swept Southeast Asia and later Korea intensified the economic crisis in Japan; six big banks have closed; Nomura and other big financial institutions have also collapsed. Conversely, the Asian crisis was exacerbated by the weakness of the Japanese economy;
* More Koreans are going to Japan; other migrant workers decreased in number due to stricter immigration policies; increased number of cases on wife battering has been observed by migrant support groups;
* Migrant wives, workers (especially Latin Americans in
the car industry) could not find jobs; they have difficulty supporting
their children due to the crisis; stateless children are not covered by
the social welfare system.
4. Malaysia
Impact on economy and local workers
* From January to end-1997, the stock market fell 53%; in January 1998, the ringgit hit a historic low of RM 4.88/US$, down 48% from the beginning of 1997; [29]
* Increase in interest rates; increase in consumer prices, especially food, rubber, palm oil; increase in food prices show that Malaysia's food security has declined as a result of industrialization;
* Mega-infrastructure projects have been stopped or suspended;
* Nonpayment of wages; decrease in workers' income;
* From July to end-1997, around 10,000 blue-collar workers have been retrenched, according to MTUC [30]; the government reported that 25,860 locals and 3,030 foreigners were laid off from January to May 9, 1998; [31]
* From July 1997 to March 1998, 435 companies have gone bankrupt; banks have been asked to merge; [32]
* From May 1998 and for the next five years, foreign firms will be allowed to own 61% of telecom firms; previous limit was 49%; [33]
* The government has refused any bailout from the IMF.
Impact on migrant workers
* Sharp increase in number of undocumented Indonesian and Burmese women migrants in Malaysia;
* Government actions primarily targeting undocumented migrant workers;
* Deportation of migrant workers - an estimated 200,000 undocumented migrants will be deported by the end of 1998; as of January 1998, more than 10,000 Bangladeshis and Pakistanis have been sent back; Filipino, Bangladeshi and Indian engineers have been sent back due to the downturn in construction;
* Redeployment of migrant workers from construction, manufacturing and services to plantations (rubber, palm) and 3D work;
* Indonesians are a special case; they are the biggest group in Malaysia because of special ties between the two countries. Instability/turmoil in Indonesia pushed thousands to Malaysia and Singapore ("new boat people"); detention of illegal entrants; forced deportation;
* No mass public protests;
* MTUC wants migrant workers to go back; [34]
* There is unity among government, NGOs and opposition
parties against the IMF.
5. Philippines
Impact on economy and local workers
* The Philippines has been under IMF tutelage in the past 30 years; crisis already there even before July 1997; this was aggravated by the Asian turmoil; foreign debt burden increased due to devaluation;
* From January to end-1997, the stock market fell 41%; the Philippine peso hit its lowest level at PHP 46.50/US$ in January 1998, losing 43% of its value since the beginning of 1997;
* As of April 1998, 1.015 million workers have lost their jobs due to the crisis; unemployment stood at 13.3%, the highest in seven years; [35]
* High interest rates; one bank has gone bankrupt in 1997;
* Factories have asked workers to work shorter hours; constriction of employment; more Filipinos are seeking jobs abroad; [36]
* In March 1998, a standby credit of US$ 1.6 billion was agreed with the IMF - after the government implemented conditionalities e.g. deregulation of oil industry, streamlining of civil service (i.e. retrenchment of public sector workers), etc.;
* The government has advised overseas Filipino workers hit by the crisis to find work in other countries instead of going back;
* Some people think that overseas workers are benefiting from the crisis because of the higher exchange rate;
* Placement fees (to work abroad) have increased tremendously: from PHP 70-80,000 to PHP 110-120,000 (for Taiwan); from PHP 35-40,000 to PHP 60,000 (for Hong Kong); [37]
* Brunt of the crisis is expected after the May 1998 general
elections.
6. South Korea
Impact on economy and local workers
* From January to end-1997, the stock market fell 39%, the lowest in 10 years; on December 12, the Korean won hit an all-time low of SKW 1,891/US$, losing 55% of its value; [38]
* Food, flour, price hikes;
* The economy headed towards its slowest growth in almost two decades; worst economic crisis since the Korean war; negative economic growth forecast in 1997; [39]
* On December 3, Seoul agreed to an IMF bailout package of US$ 57 billion, carrying tough conditionalities; many said the country is trading its fierce national pride in accepting help from the IMF; [40]
* By end-1997, a record 15,000 companies have filed for bankruptcy protection; in January 1998 it was reported that approximately 100 firms (small and medium enterprises) go bankrupt each day; closures of small and medium industries will dwarf impact of collapse of conglomerates; 3,323 companies have gone bust by January 1998; an estimated 53,000 firms expected to close by end-1998;
* At least a dozen merchant banks and two commercial banks were nearly insolvent in 1997 [41]; seven of the country's 40 largest conglomerates went bankrupt or can't pay their debts in 1997 (Hyundai, Samsung and eight other conglomerates together account for half of the Korean economy);
* From June 1997 to January 1998, 276,000 jobs have been lost; an estimated one million people were unemployed by January 1998; even locals are now willing to take 3D jobs;
* In February 1998, the National Assembly passed 18 bills on economic restructuring including those that legalize corporate layoffs and allow foreign investors greater ownership of local firms;
* By March, unemployment reached 6.5% (vs. 1.7% in 1994) - the highest since the mid-1980s;
* In March 1998, the government allowed foreign companies
to enter the investment, brokerage and banking sectors; also raised foreign
ownership limits on credit card, securities, real estate, gas station operations;
will abolish ownership ceiling in the telephone sector by the second half
of 1998; will permit up to 49% foreign ownership in telecoms (from current
33%) by 1999; [42]
Impact on migrant workers
* The government declared an amnesty from January to March 1998 so that undocumented migrant workers can go home without fine or penalty;
* In January 1998 alone, an estimated 10,800 to 18,000 migrant workers left Korea;
* Nonpayment of wages of migrant workers; undocumented migrant workers can't find work; no money even to buy return ticket;
* From June 1997 to January 1998, at least 150,000 and up to 300,000 migrant workers have been deported; the government will expel 100,000 more migrant workers beginning in April 1998; detention centers are now overcrowded;
* Unscrupulous brokers have actively used the crisis to further exploit the migrants - e.g. in December 1997 in Ansan, an agency collected SKW 5 million (US$ 4,000) each from 50 undocumented migrants, promising to send them to Japan; after payment, the migrants were reported to the police and arrested;
* Migrant trainees (ITTP) will be sent home by August
1998; however, the KFSB is still getting new trainees!
7. Thailand
Impact on economy and local workers
* In 1996, Thailand was already suffering from its worst financial crisis in more than a decade (slowest economic growth, slump in property market, high interest rates, etc.);
* On August 20, 1997, the government agreed to a US$ 17.2 billion IMF bailout package, with stringent conditionalities;
* By end-1997, the Thai stock market was down 52% compared to the start of the year; in January 1998, the Thai baht plunged to its lowest level of THB 56.10/US$, a 54% loss in value since January 1997; [43]
* Increase in prices, expected to reach 11% in 1998;
* Government has asked the people to donate/sell dollars and gold to the government;
* 58 finance firms have been suspended; many factories have closed down; e.g. Suzuki ? laid off 400 workers and sent 80 as trainees to Japan;
* The government will axe 200,000 public sector employees; [44]
* Some companies are using the crisis as excuse for anti-union actions - they are really not in serious trouble, but they close down in order to bust the union - e.g. (1) Thai Samit - can't pay wages for two months; cut bonuses; workers went on strike; closed down; (2) Par Garment (September 1997) -- strike/picket; did not want the union; used crisis as excuse to close down;
* Government encourages Thai workers to go abroad to earn
and remit dollars; government provides loans for them to go abroad. [45]
Impact on migrant workers
* In February 1998, the government announced that it intends to deport 300,000 undocumented migrants; more than 6,000 Burmese have been expelled from October 1997 to January 1998; [46]
* Bangladeshis pushed out of Malaysia are kept in Thai detention camps; suffering from diseases; Thai government said they can go back to their country anytime, but Bangladesh government doesn't or is too slow to do anything;
* In early April 1998, the ILO released a report which
criticized "inadequate protection for women and foreign workers, who
are particularly at risk of arrest and involuntary repatriation";
said that the government is arresting undocumented workers and deporting
them without their consent.
8. Singapore
* On October 29, 1997, the government offered a US$ 10 billion bailout package to Indonesia; [47]
* The stock market has been more resilient, falling only 33% from July 1997 to May 1998; the Singapore dollar hit a historic low of S$1.719/US$ (19% loss in value) in December 1997; currency and stock market can fall further as Indonesia's turmoil continues;
* Singapore has not suffered as much as the rest of Asia, but economists say its risk from Indonesia is underestimated; can be more seriously affected as situation in Indonesia worsens; Singapore has highest capital and direct investment exposure in Indonesia compared to any other country in Southeast Asia; [48]
* In February 1998, the government slashed its economic growth forecast from 5-7% to 2.5-4.5%; officials said they did not expect a recession; in May, the government reaffirmed its growth forecast despite the continuing regional crisis; [49]
* In March, the government announced that it will step up efforts against illegal immigration, as fears grew that problems in Indonesia will drive illegal immigrants to Singapore and Malaysia [50]; 3,161 illegal entrants were arrested from January to March 1998; [51]
* More than 2,300 have been laid off from June 1997 to
May 1998 due to the crisis: e.g. Western Digital Corp. (439), Seagate (1,800),
Toshiba (78); [52]
9. South Asia
* Nepal - South Asia was not directly hit by the crisis; however, the
crisis is expected to dampen the economic outlook of south Asia; "going
abroad" is now a very popular idea in Nepal ("people don't want
to farm anymore; they want to earn dollars and have a good life")
[53]; deportation of migrant workers in Korea and Japan will mean that
a large number of undocumented Nepalese migrants will be sent back to Nepal;
it will be harder for Nepalese workers abroad to find work;
* Sri Lanka - There are around 1.6 million Sri Lankan
migrant workers; the government is continuing to push more Sri Lankan workers
to Malaysia; however, this will face tremendous difficulties given the
Asian crisis and deportation of migrants from receiving countries; it is
now compulsory for all outgoing workers to register, process contracts
through SLBFE and attend a two-week pre-departure seminar.
Conclusion
"Advocates of globalization argue that it hastens
the transfer of skills and technology and enhances productivity and efficiency.
The reality is, globalization of economies reinforces the control of advanced
capitalist interests on the less developed countries, leading to the continued
marginalization, if not disintegration, of economies and sociocultural
systems in many countries in the South.
(Statement, "Migrant Workers Challenging Global Structures" Conference, 1 September 1996)
We have seen the immediate economic and social effects
of the Asian crisis. The situation will get worse (in the next few years)
before it will get better. For the workers, migrants and dispossessed,
the present situation is already a matter of survival; a harder situation
will either break people into helpless resignation, or lead to more social
unrest and polarization.
For the migrant advocates and organizers, the situation will be extremely
demanding, because the millions of displaced migrants will require urgent,
sometimes life-and-death responses. Demand for services have long overwhelmed
migrant support groups. However, it also offers great opportunities for
conscientization, organizing and collective action. The ongoing crisis
has provided us with concrete information and insights into the devastating
effects of neoliberalism. Therefore, our analyses, resolutions, advocacy
agenda and action plans can be validated and substantiated.
Advocacy and actions on what? A year after the crisis, our responses should
go beyond simply monitoring the effects of the crisis/globalization, and
into formulating strategic responses. We should address the following far-reaching
impacts of the crisis and neoliberal globalization:
On neoliberal globalization/crisis:
1. More power and control by the IMF, WB and global capital over Asian countries; many countries (especially those who accepted bailout packages) have utterly surrendered their economic sovereignty;
2. Unprecedented buy-outs and takeovers by foreign and big Asian companies of collapsed/troubled companies; in the Philippines, these opportunistic investments are aptly called "vulture funds";
3. Greater ownership and control by foreign companies over strategic industries e.g. transportation, banking, financial services, telecommunications, power generation, etc.;
4. Further strengthening of transnational banks (TNBs) and deeper penetration in Asia. While local banks collapsed due to the crisis, profits of TNBs soared due to gains from currency depreciation and derivatives investments. In Korea, profits of 39 foreign banks (led by large US banks like Citibank, Bank of America and Bankers Trust) rose 197% (to US$ 657 million) because of the crisis; [54]
5. The crisis will spur (instead of thwart) APEC's neoliberal agenda. For example, APEC members have pledged to forge ahead with liberalization despite the crisis; Thailand, Korea and Indonesia have to implement drastic neoliberal policies as part of the bailout; on December 14, 1997, members of WTO signed a landmark deal in Geneva that would liberalize financial services across the globe by 1999; [55]
6. The IMF, WB and APEC have emerged as rescuers instead of being responsible for the regional turmoil; grassroots and public awareness campaigns should help expose the role of these institutions;
7. The crisis of the global economy can destroy whole regions in one flash; the impact is widespread, but this is highly differentiated and class-related: migrants, workers, and women are worst affected; among them, the marginalized, informal, undocumented segments suffer even more;
8. Cutthroat competition spells survival in the global
economy; in the name of global competitiveness, sending and receiving countries
are "racing to the bottom" by changing laws to remove/reduce
labor protection, maximize labor flexibility, or impose more restrictive
immigration policies (Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore).
On labor migration and the social movement:
1. In sending countries, the crisis is creating a very strong "push" on labor migration. In Southeast Asia alone, 21.8 million workers will be unemployed by end of 1998; therefore, more workers will desperately seek work abroad. At the same time, governments urgently need billions of dollars to pay foreign debt, stave off further devaluation, import basic commodities and prevent economic standstill; export of labor will be the salvation of crisis-torn governments;
2. In receiving countries, the crisis has also created an intense "push" (reversing years of "pulling" migrant labor). The recession will displace over 2.1 million workers in NICs in 1998; therefore, these countries will expel almost one million migrants in 1998;
3. This double push will result in more intense competition for migrant labor markets among sending countries; despite vulnerability of their workers, sending governments will not pursue migrant protection policies because they are desperate for migrant placement and remittances;
4. There will be less pressure on receiving countries to institute migrant protection laws, especially now that they are desperately getting rid of migrant workers;
5. The crisis showed the stark vulnerability of migrant workers ??instant dismissals; arbitrary and even forcible arrests and deportation; redeployment in 3D jobs; heightened abuses and contract violations; nonpayment of wages and outright deception of migrants; lack or absence of legal protection or redress mechanisms for migrant workers;
6. The crisis and globalization are eroding workers' and migrants' wages, benefits, bargaining power, labor rights and standards; they are invoked for union-busting, anti-worker activities, and to refuse or backtrack on labor protection laws;
7. The crisis and globalization heighten the tension between local and foreign workers, because of more competition for jobs;
8. The crisis and globalization increase discrimination against migrants ? both by governments who impose arbitrary and discriminatory policies against migrants, and the local people who develop (usually mistaken) negative attitudes towards migrants (as "job stealers, carriers of diseases, second class people, undignified workers," etc.);
9. The crisis and globalization also reinforce gender biases: a) they put the burden of the difficult times on women (e.g. national frugality campaigns; women expected to manage family despite lower income or loss of job); b) more women will be sent overseas as maids, entertainers or to work in 3D jobs; c) in the labor movement, women are expected to provide unqualified support or follow the demands of their unionist husbands while the unions campaign against the crisis;
10. The crisis will encourage protests, mass actions, organizing, more militant unionism among local and migrant workers;
11. There is an immediate need to adopt national, bilateral and international legal instruments for migrants; migrants and advocates must intensify the campaign to ratify the 1990 UN migrant workers convention;
12. The present situation showed the basic importance of organizing grassroots migrants' groups and movements. The NGOs continue to be the backbone of migrant advocacy in Asia. The crisis allows us to explore various strategies in grassroots organizing. One important strategy is migrant union organizing. Migrants, after all, are workers. Sadly, in more than 10 years of migrant support work, there are hardly any migrants' unions in Asia;
13. The NGOs have an important role in helping organize migrants' groups; they should not limit themselves to giving "ambulance services" (e.g. counseling, shelter); more effort is needed in organizing, consciousness-raising, and empowerment training;
14. The crisis underscored the urgent necessity of "reintegration
programs" for migrants. This program should prepare and empower migrants
for their return. It should include mobilization of migrants' savings,
value transformation, advocacy for policy changes, and training on economic
production, organizational management, teamwork, group decision-making,
project management, organizing migrants' families and communities, and
creating community-based, production-oriented enterprises using migrants'
savings. [56]
We cannot continue to wait until drastic events like economic crises, wars,
or diplomatic rifts force migrants to return. Migrants work abroad on "borrowed
time"; this should be used to prepare for their reintegration, and
to organize, empower, and build alternatives to labor migration.
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